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The Legal Anatomy of Product Bans to Protect the
Public's Health*
James G. Hodge, Jr.** and Megan Scanlon***
I. INTRODUCTION

The vast array of products available to American consumers can be used
or consumed safely. There are products, however, that pose significant
threats to individual and community health and safety even when used as
intended. Some of these products kill thousands of people each year (e.g.,
tobacco, alcohol, salt, guns) or lead to long- or short-term physical and
mental disabilities (e.g., lead-based paints, asbestos).
Others present less significant risks to most users (e.g., caffeinated beverages). 2 Some products are inherently dangerous only in the hands of certain consumers (e.g., children's toys). 3 And some products with known,
sometimes significant risks (e.g., prescription and over-the-counter drugs)
are sold lawfully because their benefits outweigh their potential for harms
to intended users. 4
*
This manuscript is based in part on a presentation given by James G. Hodge, Jr., entitled "Assessing the Legal Environment for Mental and Behavioral Health Services in Emergencies," at Florida State University College of Law on October 15, 2013 in Tallahassee, FL,
as well as the following published manuscript: James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., New Frontiers in
Obesity Control: Innovative Public Health Legal Interventions, 5 DUKE F. FOR L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1 (2013). While the authors acknowledge funding for this project through the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, any views or opinions expressed in this article are those of
the authors and not project partners. The authors thank Susan Russo, Kellie Nelson, and
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College of Law, Arizona State University (ASU), for their research and editing assistance
with this manuscript.
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1.
See, e.g., JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 126-27 (2013).
2.
James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Consumable Vice: Caffeine, Public Health, and the
Law, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 76, 76 (2010).
3.
When warning labels were used, seventy-seven percent of consumers chose the ageappropriate toy. Jean Langlois et al., The Impact of Specific Toy Warning Labels, 265 JAMA
2848, 2849 (1991).
4.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for approval of drugs. See
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Underlying the lawful sale and use of any product is a concomitant responsibility of government, manufacturers, and sellers to assess the risks of
harm to the public's health. When risks are identified, legal or policy options to address them abound. Products may be re-designed (e.g., automobiles, lawn mowers), re-packaged with warnings (e.g., cigarettes), or restricted to specific users (e.g., alcohol).5 In some cases, federal, state, or
local governments may also ban the sale or use of products that threaten the
public's health through various legal routes and processes. That government
may ban harmful products to protect communal health is well founded.
When and how government may legally implement such bans is less understood and not easily answered.
Certain products that threaten individual health are taken off the market
almost the moment after their risks are discovered (e.g., contaminated
drugs) 6 ; others remain available for decades despite known serious risks or
may be restricted only for minors even though risks continue through adulthood (e.g., tobacco). At the same time, balancing product risks and benefits
for individuals and communities leads to variances among banned products
and creates an incomplete proxy for determining which products can be
prohibited. Broader themes are at play when assessing and implementing
product bans in the interests of communal health.
Against a backdrop of clear and objective governmental powers to proscribe harmful products are countervailing arguments grounded in law, policy, and ethics that influence the consideration and implementation of these
bans. The use and efficacy of public health product bans are predicated on
identifying and navigating a complex legal and political environment that
simultaneously supports bans on one hand, and rejects them on the other.
Lacking a definitive, existing assessment, we seek to lay out a framework
for identifying and implementing bans that are legally effective, and avoiding those that are not.
Part II succinctly reviews the spectrum of products, focused notably on
consumables, whose bans are arguably justified by threats to the public's

Alec B. O'Connor, Building Comparative Efficacy and Tolerability into the FDA Approval

Process, 303 JAMA 979, 979 (2010). As public opinion has shifted, the risks and benefits of
medical marijuana have become hotly debated. Stanley J. Watson et al., Marijuana and
Medicine: Assessing the Science Base -A Summary of the 1999 Institute of Medicine Report,
57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 547, 547 (2000).
5.
HODGE, supra note 1, at 135-40.

6.
The New England Compounding Center distributed injectable steroids contaminated
with fungal meningitis. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Multistate FungalMeningitis Outbreak Investigation (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.cdc.govihailoutbreaks
/currentsituation/.
7.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964),

available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBMQ.pdf.
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health. Three selected case studies focused on trans fats, marijuana, and tobacco help illustrate the legal and policy issues underlying product bans.
Themes culled from these case studies and other attempts to ban products
contribute to the analyses in Part III, which explores the legal paths used to
ban products that harm individual or communal health in contrast with key
legal arguments that may derail such bans. These arguments include structural and rights-based constitutional claims designed to preempt statutory or
regulatory authorities, as well as procedural hurdles that temporarily or
permanently stall product bans.
Based on this information, Part IV sets forth core elements that affect
when and how a product may be banned in furtherance of the public's
health. Collectively, these factors establish the "legal anatomy" of product
bans for which non-legal components are interwoven. Ethical considerations arise, often related to the juxtaposition of perceived paternalistic objectives behind product bans and their imposition on consumer choices.
Bans that are legally and ethically viable may only become operational if
they are also scientifically grounded and politically supported. Finally, we
address the need to determine suitable consumers for specific products, and
effectively targeting appropriate populations for certain product bans.
II.

BANNING PRODUCTS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH: PAST AND
PRESENT

Protecting individual and communal health in the United States are
common justifications for product bans both historically and in present-day.
During the Colonial Era, colonies enacted laws to prohibit the sale of adulterated bread and other "unwholesome provisions." In 1888, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state ban on oleomargarine to protect the public's
health. 9 New York City restricted lead paint for health-related reasons in
1959.o In 1988, the federal Consumer Products Safety Commission
8.
Colonies passed the laws to protect and promote both public health and trade. Wallace F. Janssen, America's First Food and Drug Laws, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 665, 66669 (1975). For example, bakers would substitute cheap ground beans or chalk in the place of
more expensive flour when making bread. Id. By regulating the weight of baked goods, the
colonies protected health and trade interests alike. Id.
9.
Powell v. Pa., 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888) ("The power which the legislature has to
promote the general welfare is very great, and the discretion which that department of the
government has, in the employment of means to that end, is very large."). Oleomargarine is
also known as margarine. See Gerry Strey, The "Oleo Wars": Wisconsin's Fight over the
Demon Spread, 85 Wis. MAG. HIST. 3 (2001).
10.
New York City banned the use of lead paint twelve years before the federal government enacted a similar ban. David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Why It Took Decades of
Blaming Parents Before We Banned Lead Paint, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/04/why-it-took-decades-of-blaming-parentsbefore-we-banned-lead-paint/275169/ ("In the case of lead paint, after three decades of industry lobbying, propaganda, and denial of danger, local health departments began to assert

Published by LAW eCommons, 2014

3

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 23 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 4

23

The Legal Anatomy of ProductBans

2014

(CPSC) banned lawn darts after the game caused thousands of injuries and
several deaths.
The list of products banned for public health purposes is extensive. It includes items ranging from asbestos 12 and insulation foam containing formaldehyde,13 to Buckyballs 14 and toys found in children's fast-food meals.15
Public health bans further encompass several consumable products, such as
raw milk,16 haggis,1 Four Loko" and other energy drinks,1 9 food coloring

themselves. In 1949, Maryland's House of Delegates passed a bill banning the use of lead
paint on children's toys and furniture-a law that was repealed under industry pressure the
following year. A few years later, the City of Baltimore health department required a warning label be placed on paint cans.").
11.
Lawn darts are an outdoor game that involved throwing metal-tipped darts toward a
target. See Bob Baker, Demands Ban on Lawn Darts: Daughter's Death Spurs a Father's
Sad Crusade, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1987, at 1-1. When CPSC decided to ban lawn darts, it
attributed three deaths to the game. Press Release, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, CPSC
Votes Final Ban On Lawn Darts (Oct. 28, 1988), http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/NewsReleases/1988/CPSC-Votes-Final-Ban-On-Lawn-Darts/. The CPSC further estimated that
lawn darts caused roughly 700 hospital emergency room treated injuries each year. Id.
12.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) summarizes various bans on asbestos
products. Envtl. Prot. Agency, U.S. Federal Bans on Asbestos, http://www2.epa.gov/
asbestos/us-federal-bans-asbestos (last visited May 22, 2014).
13.
CPSC voted to ban the foam in 1982. Press Release, Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, CPSC Bans Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation (UFFI) (Mar. 1, 1982),
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/1982/CPSC-Bans-Urea-FormaldehydeFoam-Insulation-UFFI/; see also Peter Kerr, Foam Insulation: Questions Remain, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1982, at Cl.
14.
CPSC first filed a complaint against the maker of Buckyballs in 2012 to ban the
product. Press Release, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, CPSC Sues Maxfield & Oberton
Over Hazardous Buckyballs and Buckycube Desk Toys Action Prompted by Ongoing Harm
to Children from Ingested Magnets (July 25, 2012), http://www.cpsc.gov/en/
Newsroom/News-Releases/2012/CPSC-Sues-Maxfield-Oberton-Over-HazardousBuckyballs-and-Buckycube-Desk-Toys-Action-prompted-by-ongoing-harm-to-childrenfrom-ingested-magnets-/. Buckyballs are small, round rare earth magnets that are sold as
toys and desktop accessories. Id. When children swallow them the toy can pinch or trap intestines, which may require surgery to remove. Id. Since they went on the market in 2009,
numerous incidents involving children have been reported. Id. In January 2011, a four-yearold boy had his intestine perforated after he swallowed three magnets he thought were chocolate candy. Id.
15.
In 2010, Santa Clara County, California became the first in the nation to ban toys
from fast-food children's meals that were high in calories, salt, fat, and sugar, based on the
notion that banning the toys would make the meals less appealing to kids. Alice Park, Can
Fast-Food Toy Bans Really Help Kids Eat Better?, TIME (Dec. 8, 2011), http://healthland
.time.com/201 1/12/08/can-fast-food-toy-bans-really-help-kids-eat-better/.
16.
Nat'l Conference State Legislatures, Raw Milk (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org
/research/agriculture-and-rural-development/raw-milk-2012.aspx (providing a summary of
federal and state laws regarding raw milk consumption).
17.
Since 1971, the U.S. has banned the food, haggis, imported from the United Kingdom because it contains sheep lung. Jon Kelly, The offal truth about American haggis, BBC
NEWs (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21128089.
18.
Letter from Joann M. Givens, Acting Director, Office of Compliance, Ctr. for Food
Safety & Applied Nutrition, Food & Drug Admin., to Jaisen Freeman, Chris Hunter & Jeff
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dyes,20 sassafras oil, 21 cyclamate 22 and sulfite preservatives used on fresh
fruits and vegetables.23 Some products, like the artificial sweetener saccharin, are banned temporarily and later reauthorized for commercial use.'4
More recently, state and local governments have tried unsuccessfully to ban
genetically modified foods25 and sugared sodas served in large containers.26

Wright, Phusion Projects Inc. (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2010/ucm234023.htm.
19.
While energy drinks are not completely banned, local authorities are prohibiting
them for certain consumers and events. For example, the Virginia High School League
banned student athletes from consuming energy drinks at athletic events, including practice.
Michael Dowing, Virginia High School League Bans Energy Drinks, CLARKE DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.clarkedailynews.com/virginia-high-school-league-bans-energydrinks/. Officials in Manatee County, Florida recently decided to prohibit students from consuming energy drinks before, during, and after school. Christopher O'Donnell, Energy
Drinks Banned from Manatee Schools, HERALD-TRIBUNE, July 23, 2012, http://www.
heraldtribune.com/article/20120723/ARTICLE/120729827.
20.
The ban on food coloring dyes contributed to the ten-year absence of red M&Ms.
Remy Melina, Why Were Red M&M's Discontinued for a Decade?, LIVE ScL. (Feb. 10,
2011),
http://www.livescience.com/33017-why-were-red-mms-discontinued-for-a-decade.
html. FDA also prohibits or restricts several other food coloring dyes. Food & Drug Admin.,
Color Additive Status List (Dec. 2009), http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/coloradditives/ coloradditiveinventories/ucm106626.htm.
21.
FDA banned safrole in 1960. Refusal to Extent Effective Date of Statute for Certain
Specified Food Additives, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,412, 12,412 (Dec. 3, 1960) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 121); see also 21 C.F.R. § 189.180(b) (West, WestlawNext through May 15, 2014; 79
Fed. Reg. 27,771) ("Food containing any added safrole, oil of sassafras, isosafrole, or dihydrosafrole, as such, or food containing any safrole, oil of sassafras, isosafrole, or dihydrosafrole, e.g., sassafras bark, which is intended solely or primarily as a vehicle for imparting such substances to another food, e.g., sassafras tea, is deemed to be adulterated.").
22.
Cyclamate is used as an artificial sweetener in fifty-five countries, but it is banned
in the U.S. See Claire Suddath, Are Artificial Sweeteners Really That Bad for You?, TIME
(Oct. 20, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1931116,00.html.
23.
FDA banned the use of sulfite preservatives in fresh vegetables and fruits after linking thirteen deaths and many illnesses to the substance, mainly among asthmatics. Irvin
Molotsky, U.S. Issues Bans on Sulfites' Use in CertainFoods, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1986, at
Al.
24.
William B. Schultz, The Bitter Aftertaste of Saccharin,40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
66, 66-68, 72-74 (1985).
25.
Mendocino County, California successfully banned the sale, distribution, or cultivation of GMO products. E.g. Vickie Homer, Arcata California Votes to Ban GE Crops and
Seeds Within City Limits, Nw. RESISTANCE AGAINST GENETIC ENG'G, http://www
.nwrage.org/content/arcata-califomia-votes-ban-ge-crops-and-seeds-within-city-limits
(last
visited May 22, 2014). Several GMO product bans have failed, however. In absence of governmentally-imposed bans, some manufacturers voluntarily have proposed bans of GM
foods, including General Mills, the maker of Cheerios. Annie Gasparro, GeneralMills Starts
Making Some Cheerios without GMOs, WALL ST. J, Jan. 2, 2014, http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702303370904579297211874270146.
26.
Michael Grynbaum, New York Soda Ban to Go Before State's Top Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at A23.
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A. Justifying ProductBans

Different reasons motivate product bans. Laws criminalizing heroin, for
example, are relatively straightforward; no one may possess or use this
product because of known physical harms to individuals and secondary
harms to society.2 The federal government's temporary saccharin ban
proved more complex and raised important policy questions about scientific
findings, certainty, and who should bear the health risk.28 Other bans focus
on specific audiences to help safeguard vulnerable populations. 29 To illustrate the gamut of justifications and related common themes for product
bans, consider the following three case studies centered on different types
of products: (1) trans fats, (2) marijuana, and (3) tobacco.
1. Trans Fats
In November 2013, the FDA determined that partially hydrogenated oils
(PHOs) (the primary source of trans fat) are not generally recognized as
safe for use in food based on scientific evidence showing the health risks
associated with their consumption.30 As a result, PHOs are classified as
food additives and require FDA preapproval for use.31 This new legal classification is expected to practically ban trans fats from future use.
Even though many foods once contained trans fats, there is scant public
opposition facing the ban.> Support for banning trans fats grew over several decades as studies consistently showed that its consumption contributed
significantly to high cholesterol and heart disease.33 In 2003, the FDA be27.

The U.S. first adopted laws regulating heroin in 1914. Steven B. Dukes, Drug Pro-

hibition: An UnnaturalDisaster, 27 CONN. L. REv. 571, 572 (1994); see also John Kaplan,
The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 6 DUKE L.J., 1065, 1065-70 (1972) (discussing the

primary and secondary harms stemming from drug use).
28.
William B. Schultz, The Bitter Aftertaste of Saccharin,40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
66, 66-68 (1985).
29.
Certain bans, like those on tobacco and alcohol, are based on the recognition that
minors and young adults should receive greater protection under the law.
30.
Tentative Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 78 Fed. Reg.
67,169, 67,173-74 (request for comments and for scientific data and information, Nov. 8,
2013) (period for comments extended until Mar. 23, 2014 in 78 Fed. Reg. 79,701, 79,701).
31.
Foods containing unapproved "unsafe additives" are considered adulterated and
banned from interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 342 (West, WestlawNext through
Pub. L. No. 113-93 (excluding Pub. L. No. 113-79) approved Apr. 1, 2014).
32.

Trans Fat Doesn't Stir Much 'Nanny State' Debate, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2013,

http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/11/09/trans-fat-doesnt-stir-muchnanny-state-debate/3483759/.
33.
Dariush Mozaffarian et al., Trans Fatty Acids and CardiovascularDisease, 354 N.
ENGL. J. MED., 1601, 1611 (2006) ("[G]iven the 1.2 million annual myocardial infarctions
and deaths from [coronary heart disease] in the U.S., near-elimination of industrially produced trans fats might avert between 72,000 (6 percent) and 228,000 (19 percent) [coronary
heart disease] events each year."); see also Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nutrition
for Everyone: Trans Fat (updated Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nutrition/everyone/
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gan requiring trans fat information on package nutrition labels, which allowed consumers to make informed purchases of products with the additive.34 Multiple restaurant chains also pledged to stop using trans fats.
New York City, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and California banned trans fats
from restaurant menus altogether.36 Over time, data about negative health
effects, local and industry practices instituting bans, and consumer support
for removing trans fats bolstered FDA's plans to ban it entirely.3
2. Medical Marijuana
Unlike with trans fats, marijuana bans are going in the opposite direction
as states ease restrictions on its use. Historically, state and federal authorities classified marijuana alongside other illegal drugs, such as heroin, because they considered it highly addictive and lacking legitimate medical
use. States initially regulated the drug by adopting the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act in the 1930s. 38 After taking many steps to ban marijuana importation, exportation, and manufacturing, Congress banned these activities in
1970 by listing marijuana as a "Schedule I" substance in the Controlled
Substances Act.39 As social attitudes about marijuana for medicinal purposes change, however, so are states' policies. In 1996, California legalized
basics/fat/transfat.html; Olga Khazan, When Trans Fats Were Healthy, ATLANTIC (Nov. 8,

2013, 9:23 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/when-trans-fats-werehealthy/281274/.

34.
Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Ruling Would All but Eliminate Trans Fats, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/health/fda-trans-fats.html?_r-0.
35.
Thomas M. Burton & Julie Jargon, FDA Says Trans Fats Aren't Safe in Food,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023033095

04579183652200663132.
36.
N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.08 (2006); CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED
ORDINANCE 241.42 (2011); PHILA., PENN., CODE § 6-307 (2007); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 114377 (West, WestlawNext, through Ch. 16 of 2014 Reg.Sess. and all propositions
on the June 3, 2014 ballot).
37. More people also bought menu items with zero percent trans fat after the restriction
went into place, representing an eighty-six percent increase in these healthier options over a
two-year period. Park, supra note 15.
38. Although Congress passed the Harrison Act in 1914, it did not apply to the sale, distribution, or possession of preparations containing minimal amounts of narcotic drugs, i.e.
less than two grains of opium, one eighth of a grain of heroin. Ch. 1, § 6, 38 Stat. 785
(1914); see also Harry Anslinger, The Reasonfor the Uniform State Narcotic Legislation, 21
GEO. L.J. 52, 52-62 (1932) (discussing state marijuana laws and need for national regula-

tion). States adopted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act over a period of years roughly between
1934-38. See Thomas Quinn & Gerald McLaughlin, Evolution of Federal Drug ControlLeg-

islation, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 586, 602 (1972).
39.
Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 38, at 603-06. At the federal level, marijuana remains classified as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act. Schedule I
substances are considered to have a high potential for dependency and no accepted medical

use, making distribution of marijuana a federal offense. David Savage, Medical Marijuana
Advocates Seek Reclassification of Drug, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2012, http://articles.
latimes.com/2012/oct/16/nation/la-na-pot-court-20121017.
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medical marijuana in spite of obvious conflicts with federal law.4 0 Since
then, nineteen more states and the District of Columbia have enacted similar laws regarding medical marijuana use.4' Generally, state medical marijuana programs protect individuals against arrest for prescribing or possessing small amounts of marijuana for personal medicinal use and for
selling it in approved dispensaries.4 2 This significant deviation from prior
bans of marijuana follows a drastic shift in public opinion (and a somewhat
reluctant acceptance by federal authorities to obviate prosecution).43 Medical marijuana laws also illustrate how states can alter the course of national
product bans through incremental legal changes.
3. Tobacco
Although the risks of using marijuana for medical purposes are not entirely known, harms from tobacco use are well documented.44 As early as
1938, studies linked cigarette smoking to higher cancer rates and heart disease. 45 By 1964, when the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on
Smoking and Health released its seminal report concerning tobacco effects
on health, nearly every state already had laws prohibiting the sale of ciga40. In October 2009, the Obama Administration sent a memo to federal prosecutors encouraging them not to prosecute those who distribute medical marijuana in accordance with
state law. David Johnston & Neil Lewis, Obama Administration to Stop Raids on Medical

Marijuana Dispensers, N.Y.

TIMES,

Mar.

18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009

/03/19/us/19holder.html; see also Bob Egelko, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Prop. 215 Challenge, S.F. GATE (May 19, 2009), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/U-S-Supreme-Court

-rejects-Prop-215-challenge-3298162.php.
41.
Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, State Medical Marijuana Laws (updated
Mar. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.
42.
Note that selling or possessing marijuana for other purposes remains illegal. Additionally, possessing small amounts of marijuana for recreational use is now legal in Wash-

ington and Colorado. Massachusetts voters also decriminalized possession of up to an ounce
of marijuana, making it instead a civil offense punishable by one-hundred dollar fine. Steve
LeBlanc, Mass. Activists Push to Fully Legalize Marijuana,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 2013,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/11/28/mass-activists-push-fully-legalizemarijuana/fLtTlfBFedOWLExbw4S4gL/story.html.
43.

Art Swift, For the First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP

(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizingmarjuana.aspx.
44. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TOBACCO USE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: FEDERAL
EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND REDUCE TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUTH (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/240728.pdf.
45.
Johns Hopkins University Professor Raymond Pearl released a report about tobacco

use and poor health outcomes in 1938. Raymond Pearl, Tobacco Smoking and Longevity, 87
SCIENCE 216 (1938). Similarly, in 1939, Franz Hermann MUller of the University of Cologne's Pathological Institute completed a study that found an extremely strong relationship
between smoking and lung cancer. Franz Hermann MUller, Tabakmif3brauch und Lungencarcinom, 49 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR KREBSFORSCHUNG 57 (1940). An article published in Read-

er's Digest in 1952 is also noted for influencing public opinion about cigarettes. Roy Norr,
Cancerby the Carton, READER'S DIGEST 737 (1952).
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rettes to minors.46 Since then, the federal government has continued to
strictly regulate tobacco product use by, or exposure to, minors. Recent
court opinions and FDA rules further strengthen tobacco restrictions.4 For
instance, in 2009, the FDA banned cigarettes with fruit and clove flavors in
part because of their appeal to children. 48 It is currently deciding whether to
ban menthol cigarettes for similar reasons.49
Polls indicate that adults strongly favor regulating tobacco products
when children are involved.50 Correspondingly, states and municipalities
have adopted additional laws concerning the use of tobacco products in the
presence of minors. Seven states and one territory (along with several other
cities and counties), for example, ban smoking in cars when children are also present.5' The growing number of state and city laws limiting where and
when adults can use tobacco products emphasizes how product bans succeed when they are focused on protecting the health of minors, even though
they may fail if applied to adults. Recent calls for bans on the sale and pos46.
Michael Cummings, Programs and Policies to Discourage the Use of Tobacco
Products,21 ONCOGENE 7349, 7358-59 (2002).
47.
See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
48.
See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,225, 13,230 (Mar. 19, 2010)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140). The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that Congress did not grant
FDA the authority to regulate tobacco as a drug. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). Within weeks of this ruling, FDA revoked its final
rule, issued in 1996, that restricted the sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products to children and adolescents, and that determined that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are combination products consisting of a drug (nicotine) and device
components intended to deliver nicotine to the body. In response to this Court decision,
Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which expressly
allowed FDA to regulate tobacco products. 21 U.S.C.A. § 387a (West, WestlawNext through
Pub. L. No. 113-93 (excluding Pub. L. No. 113-79) approved Apr. 1, 2014). After the Act
became law, FDA issued several requirements designed to curb the appeal of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products for minors. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 13,230.
49.
Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Invites Public Input on Menthol in Cigarettes (July 23, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements
/ucm361966.htm.
50.
For example, outdoor smoking bans are a growing trend. Outdoor Smoking Bans
Next Battleground in War over Tobacco (poll) (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.cleveland.com/
nation/index.ssf/2013/08/outdoor smokingbansnext batt.html ("Secondhand smoke is
harmful. It's particularly harmful to children,' said Councilwoman Mary Cheh of the District
of Columbia, one of more than 90 U.S. municipalities or counties considering an outdoor
smoking law.").
51.
Amy Winterfield, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, There 's Renewed Effort to
Integrate the Many Public Health Programs into the Overall Health System (Dec. 1, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/wealth-public-health.aspx. The age of the children protected by the smoking-in-cars ban varies by jurisdiction. Some states prohibit smoking with
children under six years old in the car; other states prohibit smoking with anyone under the
age of thirteen in the vehicle. Broadpublic supportforbanning smoking in vehicles with kids
present, 19 NAT'L POLL ON CHILDREN's HEALTH 1 (2013), http://mottnpch.org/sites/default/
files/documents/072213smokinglegislation.pdf.
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session of caloric-sweetened beverages among minors in the United States
take a similar tact.
B.

Policy Perspectives Underlying Bans

As illustrated in these brief case studies, public health-driven product
bans reflect recurring themes. First, a strong public health rationale is generally necessary to sustain a ban on products that allegedly harm individual
or communal health. Any negative impacts caused by products cannot
merely be suggested or illusory. Some amount of harm or a known negative
health outcome must be attributed to the product. For example, the public
associates poor health outcomes with trans fats and tobacco products because studies have consistently shown that these products are harmful, medical practitioners communicate these harms, and individuals (or people they
know) experience them often to their own detriment. At some point, the
perceived benefits of using these consumables are outweighed by their significant damaging health effects. In contrast, positive health outcomes associated with medical marijuana use may weigh more favorably against the
negative impacts of prolonged use.
Second, public opinion strongly influences whether a product should be
banned, spurring policymakers to act. 4 Public opinion supports the continued strict regulation of tobacco and, conversely, the lessening of restraints
on marijuana. 5 Third, incremental government action through local or state
restrictions, coupled with corporate initiatives, may contribute to a national
52.
See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., New Frontiersin Obesity Control:Innovative Public
Health Legal Interventions, 5 DuKE F. FOR L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 23-30 (2013) (arguing for a
proposed ban on the sale and possession of sugar-sweetened beverages among minors in
public places).
53.
There is not a clear consensus among health professionals regarding whether medical marijuana's benefits outweigh its risks. While most medicines derived from nature are
tested before they reach the public, the process to evaluate marijuana has been confounded
by its status as an illegal drug. The seminal Institute of Medicine report on medical marijuana does not clarify the issue. See INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE

SCIENCE BASE 1-12 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.phprecord-id=6376.
Rather, the report suggests that more research about the risks and benefits of medical marijuana is needed. Id. It concludes, however, that smoking marijuana is not preferred because
"numerous studies suggest that marijuana smoke is an important risk factor in the development of respiratory disease." Id. at 6.
54.
Public opinion also drove FDA to re-examine Bisphenol A (BPA) after it went on
the market. FDA initiated additional studies regarding the product's safety "[b]ecause of
concerns expressed [by the public] in the last few years." Food & Drug Admin., Update on
Bisphenol A (BPA) for Use in Food Contact Applications (updated Mar. 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/publichealthfocus/ucm064437.htm. Thus government intervention can also be used to restore public confidence in a product, such as BPA, if it can
clearly demonstrate that the product is safe.
55.
Broadpublic support for banning smoking in vehicles with kids present, supra note
51; Press Release, Nat'l Insts. of Health, 66% of 12th graders Do Not View Regular Marijuana Use as Harmful (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec20l3/nida-18.htm.
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ban. Fourth, product bans are more socially accepted when used to protect
vulnerable populations, notably those who lack capacity to make decisions
for themselves, such as minors or persons particularly susceptible to health
risks>.
Finally, product bans are not intended to curtail every risk, as evinced by
some failed or attempted bans. Product bans are more successful when
used to address unwanted or involuntary risks, such as exposure to
secondhand smoke in public places or formaldehyde used in temporary
housing. Whenever consumers are unable to consciously accept the risks
associated with a product, banning a product may be appropriate. 8
III.

EXPLORING LEGAL PATHS AND PITFALLS OF PUBLIC HEALTH BANS
OF PRODUCTS

Accompanying the varied policy perspectives that underlie product bans
are several legal powers and processes to effectuate them. Attorneys general
and private citizens may bring lawsuits challenging the safety or regulation
of a product. 59 Congress may enact statutes that have legal implications nationwide, or a city council may pass an ordinance banning a product or

56.
For example, sulfite preservatives were banned after asthmatics (persons with accentuated health risks) suffered adverse health events. In various contexts, vulnerable populations may also include individuals with disabilities, pregnant women, elderly persons, certain members of ethnic minorities, people with language barriers, and the poor. See, e.g.,
David Blumenthal et al., The Efficacy of Primary Carefor Vulnerable Population Groups,
30 HEALTH SERVS. REs. 253 (1995) (discussing vulnerable populations in a primary
healthcare setting).
57.
The temporary saccharin ban demonstrates this point. Relying on a Canadian study
that demonstrated saccharin caused cancer in laboratory rats, the FDA stated that a human
would have to drink 800 cans of diet soda each day to reach the level of exposure as that of
the Canadian rats. The FDA banned the substance, however, because federal law required it
to ban all food additives that cause cancer in animals. The saccharin ban did not last long.
Saccharin is now one of the most popular artificial sweeteners in use. See Schultz, supra
note 28.
58.
This policy perspective - consumers' ability to make an informed and voluntary
decision regarding health risks - underlies the reasoning behind product bans for minors as
well. Minors are not legally deemed to have the same mental capacity as adults when making
decisions about their actions. Thus, minors may not be able to make fully informed decisions
about the products that they use or purchase, which justifies limiting their access to certain
products. Similarly, adult consumers could not easily discern which foods contained trans
fats. Therefore, consumers could not make an informed decision about certain products until
the FDA required food labels to list trans fat content. Consumer behavior, together with studies showing the negative health outcomes associated with trans fats, laid the groundwork for
the ban.
59.
See, e.g., Plaintiff's Original Petition and Application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction, Tex. v. Redux Beverages,
No. 07-03962 (44th Judicial D. Tex., May 2, 2007), available at https://www.oag.
state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2007/050107redux-pop.pdf; Cleveland v. Ohio, 989 N.E.2d
1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
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store in certain locales.60 Federal, state, and local agencies may also promulgate regulations to proscribe products pursuant to legislative delegations.
Yet, the legal authority to ban products for public health purposes also includes countervailing individual and commercial protections. The primary
legal themes implicated by public health-driven product bans are examined
below.
A. Federal,State, and Local Authority to Regulate Products

Federal, state, and local governments are empowered to regulate products that harm public health under different legal authorities. Chief among
the federal government's ability to ban products is Congress' use of its
commerce authority and powers to tax and spend. The Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution directs Congress "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."61 Courts
have broadly interpreted this Clause, consistent with the "Necessary and
Proper" Clause, 62 and Congress has long relied on it to legislate in many
fields to promote and protect public welfare. 63 Congress used its Commerce
authority to adopt the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which established a comprehensive scheme for regulating drugs. 64 Congress similarly
exercised its commerce power to pass the Consumer Protection Act in
1972, authorizing CPSC to protect consumers from unsafe products. 5
In addition to regulating trade among the states, Congress may also legis-

60.
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); U.S. Smokeless
Tobacco Mfr. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428 (2d Cir. 2013); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von
Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2006).
61.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
62.
Id.; see also Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that lottery tickets
are items of commerce and Congress' power to regulate includes the power to prohibit);
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); United States v. Lexington Mill &
Elevator, 232 U. S. 399 (1914) (developing Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
63.
See, e.g., Thomas I. Parkinson, CongressionalProhibitionsof Interstate Commerce,
16 COLUM. L. REv. 367, 368 (1916) (discussing the breadth of Commerce Clause power
based on the Supreme Court's decision to uphold "congressional prohibitions of interstate
commerce enacted for the protection of public morals or for the advancement of the public
welfare," rather than limiting congressional power to the regulation of interstate commerce)
(emphasis added); Louis Maier, Federal Regulation of Manufacturing under the Interstate
Commerce Power, 24 MARQ. L. REv. 175 (1940) (discussing cases in which the federal government extended the scope of its authority over previously unregulated activities by using
the commerce clause).
64.
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-399f (West, WestlawNext through Pub. L. No. 113-93 (excluding Pub. L. No. 113-79) approved Apr. 1, 2014); see also Charles Wesley Dunn, Our Food
and Drug Law, 9 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 346, 347-48 (1954) (discussing interstate commerce and broad jurisdictional reach of 1938 Act).
65.
Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act in 1972, which created the
CPSC. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-2084.
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late in areas that do not at first glance appear to trigger interstate commerce,
such as the local manufacture and consumption of a product consistent with
state law. 6 Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity as long as such
activity has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce when considered
in the aggregate.6 Commerce authority can thus be used to ban products
from commerce, either through direct legislation or agency rulings or regulations.
Congress can also indirectly ban or limit consumer goods through its tax
and spend powers.6 8 The power to set tax levels means Congress can discourage risky behavior, such as smoking, 69 and reward health-promoting
activities, such as physical exercise. Congress can similarly use its spending power to influence state lawmaking so long as its efforts are not unduly
coercive upon states. 1 To encourage states to change the drinking age, for
example, Congress passed a law in 1984 that withheld highway funds from
states that did not raise their legal drinking age from eighteen to twentyone. 72 The spending measure effectively banned alcohol use among eighteen to twenty-one year-olds even though the impetus was to prevent highway-related deaths and injuries due to alcohol use. Spending powers further
allow Congress to indirectly regulate or ban products by determining which
federal agencies or research projects to fund. In 2008, for example, Congress provided CPSC with more resources to regulate toys containing

66. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
67.
Congress is authorized to regulate non-economic local activity if the regulation is "a
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce." Gonzales, 545 U.S. at
37 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
68.
U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8.
69.
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Theory and Practice in the ConstitutionalDesign, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 265, 273 (2001).
70.
For example, the Affordable Care Act provides financial incentives for workplace
wellness programs. Laura Anderko et al., Promoting Prevention Through the Affordable
Care Act: Workplace Wellness, 9 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE E175 (2012). Congress
continues to raise taxes on cigarettes, which significantly curbs the average consumer's ability to purchase them. K. J. Meier & M. J. Licari, The Effect of Cigarette Taxes on Cigarette
Consumption, 1955 through 1994, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1126 (1997) (finding increased
taxes on cigarettes are associated with less tobacco consumption); see also Prabhat Jha &
Richard Peto, Global Effects of Smoking, of Quitting, and of Taxing Tobacco, 370 N. ENGL.
J. MED. 60 (2014).
71.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) ("Congress
may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal
policies. But when 'pressure turns into compulsion' . . . the legislation runs contrary to our
system of federalism.").
72.
S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987). Congress passed the National Minimum

Drinking Age Act in 1984, which withheld five percent of federal highway funding from
states that did not maintain a minimum legal drinking age of twenty-one. 23 U.S.C.A. § 158
(West, WestlawNext through Pub. L. No. 113-93 (excluding Pub. L. No. 113-79) approved
Apr. 1, 2014).
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lead, 7 including through government-imposed bans.
Unlike Congress, which must rely on enumerated powers to act, states
(and local governments through state delegation) possess broad powers to
regulate in the interests of the public's health, safety, and general welfare.
Known collectively as "police powers," this residual authority of sovereign
governments, as reflected in the Tenth Amendment, allows government to
ban products in specific settings or among particular groups. 7 States have
often exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their
citizens 75 without the need to link measures to commercial activity, taxes, or
spending objectives. Police powers support, for instance, restrictions on tobacco use in public or private places and minors' consumption of caloriesweetened beverages at schools.
States and cities can also strategically use zoning and licensing laws to
ban products in limited ways. States typically control licensing policies
and procedures, though local authorities may impose additional licensing
requirements if they are not preempted. For example, states may establish
strict licensing criteria to regulate products that pose public health risks.
Some municipalities use their licensing authority to ensure that outlets selling tobacco, alcohol, or fast food products are restricted from certain areas. 79 Although licensing or zoning may not be used to ban products entirely,
73.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1278a.
74.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of
the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2007).
75.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) ("States traditionally have
had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protections of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons."); see also U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg.
Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 436 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding the city's law restricting the sale of flavored tobacco products and discussing use of police powers to protect public health); James A. Tobey, Public Health and the Police Power, 4 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126, 126
(1927).
76.
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000). Although these targeted
bans and regulations appear to raise Equal Protection concerns, the government needs only a
rational basis for the laws to defeat equal protection claims based on age; see also Virginia
High School League Bans Energy Drinks, supra note 19; Energy Drinks Under Scrutiny,
BEVNET.coM (Sept. 1, 2010, 2:49pm), http://www.bevnet.com/magazine/issue/2010/energy
-drinks-under-scrutiny. Fairfax County Public Schools in Virginia banned energy drinks, and
the Diocese of Arlington, which covers many Northern Virginia schools, banned energy
drinks from their school campuses. Id.
77.
See Heather Wooten et al., Zoning and Licensing to Regulate the Retail Environment and Achieve Public Health Goals, 5 DuKE F. LAw & Soc. CHANGE 65, 74 (2013). Zoning requirements run with a piece of land perpetually no matter whether ownership changes
hands. In contrast, licenses are issued for a set amount of time and usually grant rights only
to the individual licensee.
78.
See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Health Servs. License Applications - Food and Drug Licensing (last updated May 6, 2014), http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/fdlicense/apps.shtm#tanning.
For example, Texas requires tanning facilities, tattoo parlors, and food establishments to obtain state licenses. Id.
79.
Taste Me Concepts v. City of New York, 762 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (N.Y. App. Div.
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they effectively outlaw them from certain zones to curtail the prevalence of
harmful products among minors or other vulnerable consumers.
B. ConstitutionalLimitations

The government's authority to ban products is broad, but it is not unlimited. Constitutional restrictions of government power and protection of individual rights may curtail government's ability to simply ban a product
that presents a health risk. Courts may invalidate state or local product bans,
for example, that interfere with interstate commerce. The Dormant Commerce Clause, drawn implicitly from federal Commerce authority, prohibits
states and localities from passing regulations affecting interstate commerce.
The U.S. Supreme Court relied on the Dormant Commerce Clause when, in
2005, it struck down state laws that prohibited online wine sales.o Because
the laws resulted in different treatment of in-state (in-store wine sales) and
out-of-state (online wine sales) economic interests, the Court found them
unconstitutional. Thus, the laws did not withstand Dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny even though they were designed to prevent minors from
purchasing alcohol in furtherance of community health.
Similarly, a local ordinance banning chain restaurants unlawfully interfered with interstate commerce.8 2 In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that a city ordinance prohibiting "formula restaurant[s]" and limiting the size of "formula retail" establishments discriminated against interstate commerce. 83 Although the ordinance restricted in-state

2003) (holding that denial of liquor license was not arbitrary and capricious when petitioner's establishment was within 200 feet of a church in violation of local law); see also
Wooten et al., supra note 77, at 73-74; Alicia Fabbre, Will County Seeks Time on Marijuana
Law: Board Expected to Delay Setting Rules, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2013, at S9 ("Municipalities and county boards can enact rules to regulate them, but cannot prohibit such facilities
from locating in their jurisdictions."); Yesenia Robles, Garden City Pot Shops Give Town
Chance to Stand Out, Repeat History, DENV. POST, Dec. 17, 2013, http://www.denver
post.com/news/ci_24744797/garden-city-pot-shops-give-town-chance-stand ("Since Colorado voters legalized possession of up to an ounce of marijuana for adults, many municipalities
have adopted ordinances to outlaw the recreational business within their boundaries."); Jennifer Steinhauer, Fast-Food Curb Meets With Ambivalence in South Los Angeles, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at A12 (reporting that in July 2008, the Los Angeles City Council
passed a one-year moratorium on opening or expanding fast food establishments).
80.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 471, 492-93 (2005).
81.
Id. at 489, 492-94 ("The States offer two primary justifications for restricting direct
shipments from out-of-state wineries: keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors and facilitating tax collection.").
82.
Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 840 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Cachia brought a complaint against Islamorada before the district court seeking damages and injunctive relief on
the grounds that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection, Due Process, Privileges and
Immunities, and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the terms of the
Florida Constitution.").
83.
Id. at 842.
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and out-of-state establishments alike, "the regulation serve[d] as an explicit
barrier to the presence of national chain restaurants," in violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause.8 4 A local ban on milk from distant dairies and
a state ban on imported solid waste have also failed to withstand Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny, despite strong, underlying public health objectivesf. State or local product bans may therefore violate the Clause if they
favor in-state (or local) interests over out-of-state interests.
The U.S. Constitution also protects private property held by individuals
and businesses from government's inherent power to take it (i.e., through
eminent domain). 6 The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause requires government to pay owners "just compensation" if their private property is taken
for public use.8 Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Takings
Clause extends to states, each of which has its own constitutional takings
provision. Though takings generally apply to land or buildings, a regulatory
taking occurs when a government restricts the use of private property to the
point where the property no longer has an economically viable use. Many
companies, for example, argued that public smoking bans amounted to a
regulatory taking of their business interests without just compensation.89
Product bans that impact the economic viability of certain businesses may
face regulatory takings challenges. 90
Free speech issues arise whenever government attempts to limit product
access or use through advertising restrictions. The First Amendment protects not only individual speech, 91 but also commercial speech. 92 Accordingly, courts have struck down laws that prohibit businesses from advertis84.
Id.
85.
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) ("In thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the state, Madison plainly discriminates against interstate commerce. This it cannot do, even in the exercise
of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of the people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives ... are available."); Phila. v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
86.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87.
Id.
88.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
89.
The challenges based on regulatory takings were unsuccessful, and one Arizona
court recognized that plaintiffs could not show economic harm as a result of the smoking
ban. Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675, 684 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). A lawsuit in Hawaii alleging a regulatory taking because of a smoking ban similarly failed. Craig Gima, Bars Sue to
Stop Ban on Smoking, HONOLULU STAR BULL., Jan. 31, 2007, http://archives
.starbulletin.com/2007/01/3 1/news/story02.html.
90.
However, product bans clearly grounded in public health principles, such as the ban
on asbestos, will defeat regulatory takings challenges because the liability associated with
continued use of the product (severe injury or death) outweighs arguments of economic injury.
91.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
92.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
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ing prescription drug prices or the qualities of tobacco products based on
successful free speech arguments.93 Entities and individuals may also argue
that state laws impinging on their free speech rights are unconstitutional, as
illustrated by a dairy in Oregon that challenged the state's raw milk advertising ban. 94 Rather than banning commercial speech about a product entirely, laws may survive free speech challenges and more effectively influence
public health if they require companies to disclose more information about
a product, as in the earlier case of trans fat labeling.95
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevents government
from retroactively changing legal consequences for an action committed
prior to the law or rule change.96 Government cannot retroactively punish
someone for buying or selling a legal product if that product is later made
illegal.9 Nonetheless federal agencies may apply their rules retroactively to
protect the public's health where Congress has expressly granted them such
powers.98 In 1994, for example, Congress expressly authorized FDA to regulate dietary supplements in a manner similar to food products. 99 FDA thus
became responsible for keeping adulterated and unsafe dietary supplements
off the market, which meant certain products (e.g., Ephedra) became illegal
to buy or sell even though they had previously been on the market. Congress' express grant of authority to FDA to regulate these products defeated
manufacturers' Ex Post Facto claims. 100
C.

Regulatory or ProceduralHurdles

Parties may have strong legal arguments that support product bans in the
interests of public health, but procedural or regulatory missteps may affect

93.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570 (2001).
94.
Mateusz Perkowski, Dairy Challenges Oregon Raw Milk Ad Ban, CAPITAL PRESS
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.capitalpress.com/article/20131120/ARTICLE/131129989.

95.
N.Y. State Rest. Assoc. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 2009).
96. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 9.
97.
In the context of product bans, the Ex Post Facto clause is often subject to further
argument. See, e.g., Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 193 (1925) (stating that during the
Prohibition era the Court held that a state statute prohibiting the possession of alcohol did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because possession is a continuous act. The individual
could not be punished for his behavior or possession of alcohol before the law changed, but
could be punished for his continued possession thereafter).
98.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
99.
21 U.S.C.A. § 321(ff) (West, WestlawNext through Pub. L. No. 113-93 (excluding
Pub. L. No. 113-79) approved Apr. 1, 2014).
100.
See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033, 1038, 1043 (10th Cir.
2006) (noting that "Congress imposed a duty on the FDA to keep adulterated dietary supplements off the market" and that "FDA correctly followed the congressional directive to
analyze the risks and benefits of EDS in determining that there is no dosage level of EDS
acceptable for the market.").
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whether a product ban is implemented. All product bans, for instance, must
conform to due process. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
government from depriving people of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law (procedural due process) and guarantee that they will not encroach on the rights of citizens (substantive due process). Procedural due
process shields legal processes (e.g., the right to notice, the right to stand
trial) when government action deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Thus government may violate procedural due process by failing to provide
affected parties with notice or the opportunity for a hearing before banning
a product. Substantive due process, in contrast, focuses on whether there is
sufficient justification for governmental decisions to dispossess an individual of his or her rights. 01 As a result, government must ground public
health-driven product bans in scientific evidence that sustains negative
health outcomes.
Failing to appropriately justify and rationalize the product ban exposes
regulators to substantive due process challenges because their actions may
be deemed arbitrary. 102 The attempted New York City soda ban in 2013
tested this standard.103 At the trial level, the ban failed primarily because it
targeted only certain vendors and outlets. The trial judge did not criticize
the perceived weak link between sugary drinks and obesity. Rather, he
opined that the regulation "is arbitrary and capricious because it applies to
some but not all food establishments in the city. . ., and the loopholes inher-

ent in the rule" gut its purpose. 104
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets forth rulemaking practices
requiring federal agencies to solicit public input and respond to comments

101.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the FourteenthAmendment: The Unfulfilled Promise, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1143, 1149 (1992).
102.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); see Coleman v. Mesa, 284 P.3d
863, 870 (Ariz. 2012). Additionally, product bans that infringe on fundamental rights (e.g.,
owning a firearm) may violate substantive due process protection. See generally McDonald
v. Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). States that ban products without infringing on "fundamental
rights," however, may succeed against due process claims. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of
Ala., 378 F. 3d 1232, 1233 (11 th Cir. 2004) (upholding Alabama ban on the commercial distribution of "any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for anything of pecuniary value." (internal citations omitted)). ALA.
CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(2) (West, WestlawNext through Act 2014-413 of the 2014 Regular Session).
103.
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 208-09 (2013).
104.
Michael M. Grynbaum, Judge Blocks New York City's Limits on Big Sugary
Drinks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/nyregion/judgeinvalidates-bloombergs-soda-ban.html?_r-0. A copy of the N.Y. State Supreme Court
(Manhattan) order is available online at: http://www.wnyc.org/media/resources/2013
/Mar/11l/SugaryDrinks.pdf; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at

*20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
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when proposing and issuing regulations. For example, the Consumer Product Safety Information Act of 2008 granted CPSC with new regulatory and
enforcement tools to regulate or ban unsafe products.os To effectuate the
new law, CPSC implemented regulations concerning product safety and
product bans, which included periods of public comment and hearings regarding the proposed regulations.10 6 CPSC's failure to follow the APA
would invalidate its regulations upon a challenge.
Finally, proper legal channels must be followed when implementing a
product ban. When the New York City Board of Health tried to enact a portion ban for large sodas, as discussed above, the appellate court held that the
Board acted outside its lawfully delegated authority.10 7 Pursuant to the
state's separation of powers doctrine, New York administrative agencies
may only affect policy mandated by statute. The legislature must speak
about a policy before an agency may undertake interstitial rulemaking - only then can the rule survive.108 Accordingly, product bans may only survive
challenge if they follow these regulatory and procedural pathways.
IV.

PRESCRIBING FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH BANS

As conceived above, public health bans refer to governmental efforts to
prohibit the sale or possession of specific products in an otherwise open
market because of the product's deleterious health impacts. In contrast,
manufacturers or suppliers may voluntarily remove products from the market for many reasons, including poor sales resulting from consumer health
concerns. While the end result of voluntary product removals can be the
same as government-mandated bans, the tenuous nature and unpredictability of such removals necessitate more definitive guidance for when and how
government should prohibit products in response to public health concerns.
To this end, the legal anatomy of successful public health product bans is
constituted of a series of core elements. Conversely, the absence of these
core elements may doom attempts to prohibit products for which legal and
other justifications are scant or missing either at the initial stage of proposed bans (e.g., tobacco) or later when existing bans are reconsidered (e.g.,

105.
The Act included provisions addressing, among other things, lead, toy safety, durable infant or toddler products, third-party testing and certification, tracking labels, imports,
and all-terrain vehicles. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C.A. §§
2051-84 (West, WestlawNext through Pub. L. No. 113-93 (excluding Pub. L. No. 113-79)
approved Apr. 1, 2014).
106.
Safety Standard for Magnet Sets, 77 Fed. Reg. 53,781 (Sept. 4, 2012). Individuals
and businesses may also petition the CPSC to regulate or ban certain products. For CPSC's
list of the petitions online, see http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Regulations-Laws-Standards/
Rulemaking/Petitions/.
107.

N.Y. Statewide Coal. ofHispanic Chambers of Commerce, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 213.

108.

Id. at 211-12.
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marijuana).1 09 Navigating the legal environment ahead of forward-looking
bans, as well as their reversals, involves public health justification, clear legal authority, ethically-sustainable grounds, political support or neutrality,
and appropriate targeting of populations.
In the past, government may have sought to ban products in the interests
of the public's health with little or illusory scientific grounds to support its
action."1 Today, federal, state, and local authorities are being held to a
higher standard, requiring strong scientific support for imposing a marketwide or population-specific product ban." Even so, generating support
through empirically-driven studies or clear scientific findings can be relatively easy. For example, showing that an infant's toy contains lead paint
may result in immediate market removal of the product because prior studies have proven that small amounts of lead exposure are dangerous to children's health. 112 In other cases, however, crafting and communicating scientific support for product bans is precarious, especially when it involves
products whose harms are latent in small doses. Occasional exposures to
particular insecticides among consumers of raw vegetables may raise few
health risks. Yet regular exposures to the same insecticides among farm
workers in the fields may implicate serious, long-term harms sustaining a
product ban.11 As noted below, determining the targeted population for a
product ban (e.g., farmers) is as essential as assessing the potential harms of
occasional versus routine exposures.
Federal, state, and local governments have several legal routes allowing
them to ban products in the interests of the public's health. 114 Identifying
and selecting the appropriate source of legislative or regulatory power are
critical to the success of the ban itself to counter legal arguments based on
procedural or substantive principles raised by inapposite parties. t s Nevertheless, when there is sufficient scientific justification for product bans, adequate legal authority typically follows. Congress authorizes multiple federal agencies (e.g., FDA,"' CPSC,11 and EPA 1 .) to prohibit the sale or

109.
See supra Part II.
110.
See Marcia Angell, Shattuck Lecture - Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 NEw ENG. J.

MED. 1513, 1513-14 (1996); see also Schultz, supra note 28, at 66-67.
111.
See supra Part II.
112.
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Brief Report: Lead Poisoningfrom Ingestion of a Toy Necklace - Oregon, 2003, 53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 509, 509-

11 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5323a5.htm.
113.
Freya Kamel & Jane A. Hoppin, Association of Pesticide Exposure with Neurologic Dysfunction and Disease, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 950 (2004).
114.
See supra Part III.

115.
116.
117.

See supra Part III.C.
See O'Connor,supra note 4.
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 2051-84 (West, WestlawNext
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possession of products that harm communal health so long as they have scientific support. Consistent with, or in the absence of, federal actions, states
(and local governments with sufficient home rule) are equipped with broader public health powers to intervene. Judicious use of these broad powers is
essential to avoid the pitfalls of contrary legal arguments that can derail
well-intended product bans.
What science supports and the law allows may still not result in an effective product ban if the means or ends of government action are not ethically-sustainable. American consumers are often reticent to allow government
to dictate the terms in which specific products may or may not be sold.
Communities may resist or reject public sector paternalism designed to protect autonomous consumers from product harms when they could essentially protect themselves from these products through their own choices. Attempts to control obesity in New York City by limiting soda consumption
through container size limits have been summarily rejected by many as
"nanny" state interventions.11 9 Even though empirical evidence and legal
authority to institute the ban on large portion sizes of sodas may be sufficient, public acceptance of the measure is not. 120
The public's perception of the ethicality of proposed bans is coupled
with the political acceptability of governmental intervention. Political actors
at all levels must either support, or at least remain neutral toward, proposed
bans for obvious reasons. Absent political support, public health officials
may be stymied in their attempts to even propose a ban. When political
forces are neutral, apathy for proposed bans may result in inaction. Political
resistance or opposition is a death knell for otherwise solid product ban
proposals. 121
Finally, targeting appropriate populations is key to any proposed ban.
through Pub. L. No. 113-93 (excluding Pub. L. No. 113-79) approved Apr. 1, 2014).
118.
15 U.S.C.A. § 2601.
119.
See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Bloomberg's Health Legacy: Innovator or Meddling Nanny?, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 19 (2013).
120.
See HODGE, JR., supra note 1, at 183. New York City's Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, and its Health Department's campaign against the sale of large sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) was meant to deter their consumption through education and restricted portion
controls. On March 11, 2013, a local court blocked implementation of the City's portion size
proposal, which was affirmed on appeal on July 30, 2013. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013
WL 1343607 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)).
121.
No better example of this point exists than tobacco regulation in the United States.
Prior attempts to regulate tobacco products by FDA may have led to a complete product removal given the significant harms of tobacco use coupled with no known benefits to consumers. However, in 2009, Congress clarified through the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act that tobacco was to remain a lawful product on the market notwithstanding significant controls on access among minors and restrictions on its advertising and
promotion. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 387 (West, WestlawNext through Pub. L. No. 113-93 (excluding Pub. L. No. 113-79) approved Apr. 1, 2014).
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Many products present few dangers to some consumers but adverse risks
for others (e.g., pesticides). Banning such products for all consumers may
lack legal grounding unless the only intended consumers for the product are
those who may sustain harm (e.g., infant toys with lead paint as noted
above). Defensible public health bans attempt to remove products that present clear harms to consumers who cannot obviate these risks through their
own choices. In such cases, consumers are vulnerable to harms that government is uniquely positioned to measure and address. When consumers
are otherwise adequately informed of product risks, can weigh their benefits, and self-determine whether to use the product, bans become less viable
options.
V. CONCLUSION

Determining the essential legal elements, or anatomy, of product bans to
protect the public's health provides initial guidance, but the trail leading to
successful bans remains rocky. Deviations from the beaten path may arise
when the product targeted for prohibition, even among select populations, is
entrenched in the market (e.g., soda), occupies a major part of the U.S. or
global economy (e.g., tobacco), is readily available on the black market
(e.g., illicit drugs), or shares all of these criteria (e.g., alcohol). Welldesigned public health campaigns may lead to product bans only after raising public awareness of specific risks associated with product usage (e.g.,
trans fats). Industries may unilaterally respond by altering or removing
harmful products. Government, however, indubitably has the power and
ability to ban products when justified to preserve and promote communal
health.
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